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The appellants Summit County, the Summit County Commission 
and the Suicimit County Planning Commission (hereinafter referred 
to collectively as "Summit County") and Utelite Corporation 
("Utelite"), each defendants below, submit this Joint Brief of 
Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error by entering 
findings of fact and a partial summary judgment on a disputed 
factual record? 
Standard of Review: 
Issue of law—correctness. Berenda v. Lancrford, 914 P. 2d 
45, 50 (Utah 1996); Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 
909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Utah App. 1996). 
Preservation of Issue: 
Memoranda opposing partial summary judgment (R. 169-71, 182-
88); Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Proposed Order (R. 245-49); Utelite's Motion to Set 
Aside Order for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 516-47). 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error by 
concluding that Summit County's actions leading to the placement 
of the Utelite loading facility violated the Summit County 
Development Code? 
1 
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue: same as 
Issue 1 above. 
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error by 
concluding that Summit County's actions leading to the placement 
of the Utelite facility deprived the plaintiffs of due process of 
law? 
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue: same as 
Issue 1 above. 
4. Did the trial court err in determining that Summit 
County acted in violation of the Utah Open and Public Meetings 
Law, Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-1, et seg.? 
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue: same as 
Issue 1 above. 
5. Did the trial court commit reversible error by stating 
in its order for partial summary judgment an intention to issue 
an injunction requiring Summit County to effectuate the removal 
of the Utelite loading facility? 
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue: same as 
Issue 1 above. 
6. Did the trial court commit reversible error by 
determining that the Union Pacific Railroad was not a necessary 
and indispensable party to this action? 
Standard of Review: 
Interpretation of the Rules of Civil Procedure—correctness. 
Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 909 P.2d 271, 272 (Utah 
App. 1995); Berenda, supra, at 50. 
2 
Preservation of Issue; 
Summit County's motion to dismiss for non-joinder 
(R. 143-48); Utelite's memorandum in opposition to 
plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment (R. 169-71); 
Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Proposed Order (R. 247-48). 
7. Did the trial court commit reversible error in failing 
to set aside the prior rulings and orders of Judge Wilkinson 
which had been demonstrated during the course of later 
proceedings to be in error? 
Standard of Review: 
Legal issue—correctness. Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 
P.2d 862, 864-65 (Utah 1995). 
Preservation of Issue: 
Trial Transcript at 19 (R. 2369); Utelite's Motion to Set 
Aside Order for Partial Summary Judgment and supporting 
memorandum (R. 513-536); Utelite's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment re: Nuisance Per Se and supporting 
memorandum (R. 1205-1223). 
8. Did the trial court commit error in concluding that 
violation of the Summit County Development Code constituted a 
legally sufficient basis for a claim of nuisance per se? 
Standard of Review: 
Legal issue—correctness. Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 
P.2d 862, 864-65 (Utah 1995). 
3 
Preservation of Issue: 
Trial Transcript at 19-20; Utelite Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment Re: Nuisance Per Se (R. 1205-2 3). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-8. Suit to void final action—Limitation— 
Exceptions. 
Any final action taken in violation of Sections 52-4-3 
and 52-4-6 is voidable by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. Suit to void final action shall be 
commenced within 90 days after the action except that 
with respect to any final action concerning the 
issuance of bonds, notes, or other evidences of 
indebtedness suit shall be commenced within 30 days 
after the action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Introduction 
This action was litigated for nearly six years in Third 
District Court for Summit County before a number of different 
judges. The convoluted procedural history and confusing results 
reflect the limitations of the system of rotating judges still 
employed in Summit County. See Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 
438-40 (Utah 1993) (Orme, Ct. App. J. concurring). By resolving 
fact issues on summary judgment and otherwise misapplying the law 
in the first substantive ruling in this action, Judge Homer 
Wilkinson introduced error that went uncorrected and continued to 
taint later proceedings and to perplex subsequent judges who 
handled the case. This Court should correct both that threshold 
error and all subsequent errors flowing from it. 
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Nature of the Case 
The plaintiffs seek injunctive and monetary relief with 
respect to Summit County's approval and Utelite's placement of a 
rail car loading facility (the "Facility") in the vicinity of the 
plaintiffs' property in the unincorporated area of Summit County 
known as Echo, Utah. The case proceeded in two stages: (a) 
litigation of claims for injunctive relief against Summit County 
based on alleged procedural defects in the approval of the 
Facility (resolved by summary judgment in 1991/93) and (b) 
litigation of claims for equitable and monetary relief based on 
nuisance per se (resolved by partial summary judgment and by 
trial to the jury and the court in 1995/96). 
Course of Proceedings 
The Claims Against Summit County 
The plaintiffs commenced this action on July 31, 1990, by 
filing a Complaint naming the Summit County entities as 
defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that, in approving the 
placement of a loading facility in Echo, Utah (the "Facility"), 
Summit County (a) had failed to afford the plaintiffs due 
process, (b) had abused its discretion, (c) had violated the 
Summit County Development Code, (d) had violated the Open 
Meetings Act, and (e) had otherwise acted contrary to "statutes, 
ordinances and common law." (R. 1-14) On November 2, 1990, the 
plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, naming Utelite as a 
defendant, but without advancing any new theories and without 
stating any specific claims against Utelite. (R. 62) 
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On April 19, 1991, the plaintiffs moved for Summary Judgment 
against Summit County. (R. 104) Utelite was not named as a 
party to that motion.17 
On May 9, 1991, Summit County and Utelite moved to dismiss 
the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7) because the plaintiffs had 
failed to join as a party defendant the owner of the property on 
which Utelite had built the Facility—the Union Pacific Railroad 
(the "Railroad"). (R. 143, 161) 
The motion for summary judgment and the motion to dismiss 
were heard on July 8, 1991, by Judge Homer Wilkinson.-7 The 
trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and denied 
the motion to dismiss. At the hearing, Judge Wilkinson observed: 
I do decline to grant their [the plaintiffs'] Motion for a 
Cease and Desist Order and for a Writ of Injunction. That I 
don't know what the parties intend to do concerning this 
matter—I probably think I do. But I think that if I issue 
that cease and desist order, that could put them out of 
business. It could do irreparable damages to them during 
the appellate procedure. And I think that the parties could 
be further injured by that, but I think that could be some 
monetary damages. And therefore, I am going to grant the 
Motion for Summary Judgment but refuse to grant the Motion 
for Injunctive Relief to cease and desist. 
However, I will indicate that if this matter is not taken 
further, within 30 or 60 days, that the injunctive relief 
would be granted. And I am certainly not advising you to 
- The plaintiffs stated: "At the outset it should be noted that 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is limited to claims against Summit 
County and does not seek relief from Utelite." (R. 204) 
- Because of rotating assignments to the Third District Court, Summit 
County, and the duration of these proceedings, various judges have heard this 
action: Judge Wilkinson, Judge Young, Judge Iwasaki, Judge Brian and Judge 
Noel. 
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appeal the case, but in my own mind I can see that there is 
probably not much chance that you are not going to. 
(R. 235-242 attached as Addendum 1.)-' 
On August 22, 1991, the plaintiffs lodged with the Court 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law together with a 
proposed Order granting the Summary Judgment. (R. 245) Despite 
an October 15, 1991, hearing on Summit County's objections to the 
form of these, the proposed Findings and Conclusions and the 
proposed Order remained unsigned for nearly two years. 
(R. 265-71, 275) 
On July 26, 1993, the trial court issued an Order to Show 
Cause why the action should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute. (R. 275) At an August 23, 1993, hearing on the Order 
to Show Cause, Judge Wilkinson finally entered the Findings and 
Conclusions and Order Granting Summary Judgment tendered in 
August 1991. (R. 278, 282 attached hereto as Addenda 2 and 3) 
The Order found that, in "the emplacement of the Utelite 
Facility," Summit County had violated the Summit County 
Development Code, the Open and Public Meetings Law, Utah Code 
Ann. § 52-4-1, and the due process rights of the plaintiffs. 
(A. 3:1) The Order denied the motion to dismiss. In pertinent 
part, the Order provided (A. 3:2): 
The effectiveness of this order is stayed for sixty (60) 
days from the date this order is entered. If no appeal is 
taken within that time period, then an injunction shall 
issue and Defendant Summit County shall be required to 
- References to the Addendum shall be "A." followed by the number of the 
attachment and the specific page number within of that attachment cited. 
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effectuate the removal of Utelite from their currently 
occupied site. 
Summit County filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal with 
the Utah Supreme Court on September 13, 1993, which the Supreme 
Court denied by order dated October 28, 1993. 
The Claims Against Utelite 
At a pretrial conference held on February 14, 1994, Judge 
David Young granted the plaintiffs leave to file a Second Amended 
Complaint. (R. 303) On March 11, 1994, the plaintiffs filed 
their Second Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief stating for the first time damage claims 
against Utelite. The plaintiffs' claims against Utelite included 
"common law nuisance," "statutory nuisance," "trespass," 
"negligence," "infliction of emotional distress," and "attorney's 
fees and expenses." (R. 304-42) As to Summit County, the 
plaintiffs sought an award of attorney's fees. 
On November 4, 1994, the plaintiffs sought leave to file a 
Third Amended Complaint to add claims regarding an alleged public 
right-of-way affected by the placement of the Facility. (R. 779) 
The trial court entered an order dated March 13, 1995, denying 
any further amendment because it would necessarily involve adding 
the Railroad as a party thus delaying the proceedings. (R. 1024-
27) 
Utelite gave notice on July 14, 1995, of its request that, 
notwithstanding the plaintiffs' request for a jury trial, the 
judge determine all equitable issues including any claim for 
injunctive relief. (R. 1734-35) 
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By Order dated September 6, 1995, Judge Pat Brian entered 
partial summary judgment in favor of Utelite dismissing the 
claims for infliction of emotional distress and for award of 
attorney's fees, the latter without prejudice to the plaintiffs' 
renewal of the claim at the conclusion of trial• (R. 1766-68 
attached as Addendum 4•) 
The remaining claims against Utelite came on for trial 
before Judge Frank G. Noel on September 12, 1995. Before the 
commencement of trial, the court ruled that (a) Judge Wilkinson's 
1993 Order for Partial Summary Judgment implicitly included a 
finding that the Utelite loading facility violated the Summit 
County Development Code and (b) by reason of this violation the 
Facility was a nuisance per se. (R. 2365-69) Given this finding 
of liability, the parties stipulated to dismissal without 
prejudice of all other claims of liability leaving only the 
issues of actual damages and punitive damages for the jury and 
the issue of equitable relief for the court. (R. 2368-69) 
The jury heard evidence from September 12 through 15, 1995, 
and returned a verdict awarding general damages for the six and 
one-half year time period from April 24, 1989, through 
September 15, 1995, in the following nominal amounts: Jane and 
Richard Harper—$5,000 each; Frank Cattelan—$3,000; and Richard 
Richins—$1,500.^ The jury found that the plaintiffs had not 
suffered any reduction in the market value of their property or, 
in the case of the plaintiff Cattelan, any business injury. The 
- The plaintiffs had sought general damages in excess of $250,000. 
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jury a lso found t h a t the p l a i n t i f f s were not e n t i t l e d to any 
exemplary damages. (R. 1988-90) 
On February 13, 1996, the t r i a l court entered i t s Final 
Judgment on Special Verdict denying the Harpers any fur ther 
equi table r e l i e f and otherwise enter ing Judgment cons i s ten t with 
the j u r y ' s Special Verdict . (R. 2097-2102 attached as 
Addendum 5.) On April 23, 1996, pursuant to the Utah Open 
Meetings Act, the t r i a l court entered i t s Order Re: Award of 
P l a i n t i f f s ' At torney 's Fees awarding to the p l a i n t i f f s against 
Summit County the sum of $11,150. (R. 2322-23) On May 10, 1996, 
the t r i a l court entered i t s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law Re: Equitable Relief f inding: 
The F a c i l i t y a t present (a) i s not injur ious t o the 
p l a i n t i f f s , (b) does not adversely affect the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
use and enjoyment of t h e i r property, and (c) does not cause 
any property damage to the p l a i n t i f f s . 
(R. 2332-36 at tached as Addendum 6.) This completed a l l 
proceedings in the t r i a l court , and Summit County and U t e l i t e 
j o i n t l y noticed t h e i r appeal on May 31, 1996.-; 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
U t e l i t e and t h e Ra i l road 
U t e l i t e mines and processes l ightweight aggregate a t i t s 
p lant near Peoa, Utah. (R. 2831) Until 1989, U t e l i t e loaded 
aggregate for ou t -o f - s t a t e shipment via the Ra i l road ' s Park City 
-' To avoid any contention that they had f a i l e d to preserve t h e i r r ight 
to appeal, Summit County and U t e l i t e had previously noticed an appeal in 
response to the February 13, 1996, Final Judgment on Special Verdict on 
March 4, 1996. Based on a review of the docketing statements submitted in 
support of those appeals and cross-appeals in Case No. 960121, the Utah 
Supreme Court, by Order entered May 31, 1996, dismissed the appeal without 
prejudice for lack of f i n a l i t y . 
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branch line at a portable loading facility next to the Spring 
Chicken Inn in Wanship, Utah, (R. 2836) 
The Railroad owns a right-of-way through the unincorporated 
town of Echo, Utah. This right-of-way includes two main 
transcontinental line tracks along with a passing track and an 
"industry track.11 (R. 2816-18) The Railroad has operated in 
Echo since 1869. (R. 1673) In the past, the Railroad has 
operated a loading facility and a railroad yard at the Echo 
right-of-way. (R. 2616-17) 
In 1988, the Railroad obtained regulatory authority to 
abandon its Park City branch line. (R. 2802) To secure 
Utelite's agreement to the abandonment of the Park City line, the 
Railroad offered (a) to lease property at the Echo right-of-way 
to Utelite on favorable terms and (b) to defray certain expenses 
associated with Utelite's establishment of a loading facility at 
the Echo right-of-way. (R. 2839) Utelite accepted the 
Railroad's offer and commenced preparations to construct a new 
loading facility on the industry track at the Echo right-of-way. 
(R. 2839-40) 
Utelite and Summit County 
As part of those preparations, Utelite inquired of Summit 
County regarding any regulatory approval needed to construct the 
Facility. (R. 559) Summit County suggested that Utelite attend 
a December 13, 1988, meeting of the Summit County Planning 
Commission to verify what permits or other approvals might be 
needed to construct the Facility. (Id.) 
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Utelite officer Carsten Mortensen ("Mortensen") attended the 
December 13, 1988, meeting of the Summit County Planning 
Commission to inquire regarding any needed governmental approval. 
Summit County Planning Commission officials at the meeting 
indicated to Mortensen that the placement of the Facility on the 
Railroad's industry track was a "permitted use" consistent with 
the historic use of the property as a railroad siding and loading 
site. Mortensen understood from this that placement of the 
Facility did not require any special action by the Planning 
Commission. (Id.) Summit County confirmed this by a letter 
dated January 13, 1989. (R. 122 attached as Addendum 7.) 
Utelite completed the Facility and commenced operations 
there on April 24, 1989. 
Utelite and the Plaintiffs 
The plaintiffs own property near the Facility. The 
Railroad's tracks through Echo lie between the Facility and the 
property of all plaintiffs but Richins (whose property lies west 
of 1-84). Trains pass through Echo on these tracks between 15 
and 2 0 times per day. (A. 6:2) 
Semi-trucks transport aggregate to the Facility for loading. 
Weekly at the Facility, Utelite loads on average six and one-half 
railroad cars. To load a single railroad car requires four 
truckloads and a total of 40 minutes loading time. The Facility 
currently operates, with occasional exceptions, on weekdays 
during daylight hours. (A. 6:2) 
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The plaintiffs have complained that the Facility generates 
intolerable levels of dust and noise. To deal with dust from the 
loading operations, Utelite has taken the following steps: 
(a) Construction of a metal enclosure at the Facility. 
(b) Installation of a bag house and duct work at the 
Facility. 
(c) Paving of the access road to the Facility. 
(d) Installation of curtains and an electric door at 
the Facility. 
(e) Watering down aggregate at the Utelite plant. 
(f) Installation of a hood and metal coverings over 
the conveyor belt and drop areas at the Facility. 
(g) Response to resident complaints called in to the 
Utelite plant including termination of loading on 
windy days. (A. 6:3) 
To deal with noise problems from the operation of the 
Facility, Utelite has taken the following steps: 
(a) Installation of a muffler on the bag house. 
(b) Instruction to truckers not to bang railroad cars 
in connection with loading. (A. 6:3) 
.To deal with other annoyances, Utelite has: 
(a) Removed outdoor lighting at the Facility. 
(b) Terminated night loading. 
(c) Instructed truck drivers to yield to other 
vehicles seeking access to the frontage road on 
the far side of Interstate 84 through the road at 
the Facility. (A. 6:3, 4) 
As a result of the actions taken by Utelite, the Facility at 
present (a) is not injurious to the plaintiffs, (b) does not 
adversely affect the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their 
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property, and (c) does not cause any property damage to the 
plaintiffs. (A. 6:4) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The fundamental error which tainted all further proceedings 
in this action occurred when Judge Homer Wilkinson resolved 
disputed questions of material fact on a motion for partial 
summary judgment. The transcript of the Judge7s Bench Ruling 
amply demonstrates that the trial court improperly considered the 
weight, persuasiveness and credibility of the evidence on at 
least three (3) critical disputed factual issues. The court then 
entered findings of fact that ignored those critical factual 
disputes and afforded no support for the conclusions of law. 
Judge Wilkinson compounded this fundamental deficiency when 
he erroneously determined: 
(a) Summit County's interpretation of its Development 
Code in response to Utelite's inquiry regarding 
the proposed construction of the Facility violated 
the Development Code and was therefore null and 
void. 
(b) This interpretation deprived plaintiffs of due 
process of law. 
(c) The plaintiffs could wait over 18 months to 
challenge Summit County's course of dealings with 
Utelite under the Utah Open Meetings Law. 
(d) The modest procedural defect identified by the 
trial court required the removal of the Utelite 
facility. 
(e) The Union Pacific Railroad was not a necessary and 
indispensable party to a judicial determination 
regarding the historical, present and future use 
of its property and facilities in Echo, Utah. 
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The various other judges who heard various aspects of later 
proceedings in this case declined to correct Judge Wilkinson by 
revisiting his earlier erroneous ruling• 
The plaintiffs' damage claims against Utelite proceeded to a 
jury trial based, in part, on Judge Frank Noel's reliance on the 
implication in Judge Wilkinson's earlier ruling that there was a 
zoning violation. From this Judge Noel erroneously concluded 
that the continued operation of the Facility was a nuisance per 
se. These fundamental errors in the decisions of the trial court 
should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST SUMMIT COUNTY ON A DISPUTED 
FACTUAL RECORD. 
Judge Wilkinson "adopt[ed]" Findings of Fact in granting 
partial summary judgment. (A. 2:1) On their face, the findings 
do not disclose whether the trial court viewed them as undisputed 
facts or findings from evidence that "persuaded11 the court. (See 
A. 1:4, In. 3.) If the findings are true factual determinations 
from a disputed record, they are inappropriate and require 
reversal. If the findings purport to state all "undisputed 
facts" material to determination of the motion for partial 
summary judgment, there are clearly several material facts not 
addressed by the trial court that are in dispute. 
Summary judgment requires the absence of any genuine issue 
of material fact. Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P. "xThe trial court 
must not weigh the evidence or assess credibility7 in a summary 
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judgment." Dubois v. Grand Central, 872 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah 
App. 1994) quoting Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, 
Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984). "If summary 
judgment is proper . . . , the material facts are, by definition, 
undisputed and there are no facts which the court has to find." 
Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 168-69 (Utah App. 1989) 
(emphasis in original). Thus, a court need not enter findings of 
fact in ruling on a motion for summary judgment and any such 
findings invite scrutiny. See, e.g., Rule 52(a), Utah R. 
Civ. P.; Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 125 (Utah 
1994). 
Judge Wilkinson's ruling in favor of the plaintiffs on their 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment required resolution of 
disputed fact issues. The key threshold fact at issue was 
whether Summit County's course of dealings with Utelite in 
December 1988 and January 1989 could somehow be characterized as 
constituting a legislative exercise of the zoning power resulting 
in an amendment to the Summit County Development Code effectively 
rezoning the property in question, as opposed to merely an 
administrative inquiry into the interpretation and application of 
Summit County's Development Code as applied to a specific 
proposed use or activity. 
The plaintiffs asserted that "[o]n December 13, 1988, 
Utelite went before the Summit County Planning Commission seeking 
approval for construction of the facility in Echo." (R. 103 
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[emphasis added])-7 All Utelite or Summit County have ever 
acknowledged was that H[t]he President of Utelite Corporation 
dropped into a Planning Commission meeting on December 13, 1988, 
to inquire as to the zoning in Echo." (R. 183) In connection 
with a later Motion to Set Aside the Partial Summary Judgment, 
Utelite's president submitted his affidavit that "he attended the 
December 13, 1988, meeting . . . to inquire regarding the 
necessity of a building permit and any other required 
governmental approvals." (R. 550) See also R. 2114 (Deposition 
of Carsten Mortensen at 65-71). Summit County's confirming 
letter stated the following about the December 13, 1988, contact: 
"It was the consensus of the Commission that the Utelite 
operation . . . could be moved to the Echo location. This would 
be considered a permitted use at the Echo site." (A. 7) 
In his Finding 2, Judge Wilkinson resolved this dispute. 
Without explanation, he adopted the plaintiffs' characterization 
of the Utelite/Summit County contacts as "seeking approval for 
the construction." (R. 279) Although he never so stated 
expressly, it appears that Judge Wilkinson viewed Summit County's 
response to Utelite's inquiry as the functional equivalent of a 
legislative decision amending the provisions of the Summit County 
Development Code resulting in the rezoning of the property in 
- Although the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment relied upon Uteliters 
discovery responses, the appellants' review of the record on appeal disclosed 
for the first time that these were not submitted to the trial court. (R. 104-
42) See Rule 4-502(3), Code of Judicial Administration. The actual language 
of the interrogatory answers cited in the motion did not admit that Utelite 
ever sought any approval. 
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question rather than simply an administrative decision 
interpreting the existing provisions of the Development Code in 
response to Utelite's inquiry regarding the proposed construction 
of the loading facility. Most of the remaining error in this 
action flowed from that critical unwarranted and unexplained 
resolution of a disputed issue of material fact. Despite the 
efforts of Utelite and Summit County to obtain reconsideration of 
this error up to the very commencement of trial, no other judge 
would revisit the merits of Judge Wilkinson's decision. (R. 245, 
513 and 2369) 
Judge Wilkinson himself acknowledged the factual dispute 
regarding the nature of the Summit County/Utelite contacts: 
[W]hen you say that the president of Utelite walked into a 
meeting and discussed this and then the administrator sends 
him a letter and says, Go ahead and do it, that it's a 
permitted use, it just doesn't wash with this Court that the 
activities can be carried on in that manner. 
(A. 1:3 Ins. 10-15; emphasis added.) 
The court clearly did not like what it had heard of the 
Utelite/Summit County contacts, but a hearing on a motion for 
partial summary judgment was not the place to evaluate the meager 
record. This impatience led Judge Wilkinson to commit error in 
deciding on a disputed record that Utelite "sought approval" from 
Summit County. 
Closely related to the factual dispute over "approval" is a 
second factual dispute over the Railroad's long-established 
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nonconforming use of i t s Echo right-of-way-7 and the placement of 
the F a c i l i t y on that r ight-of -way. Judge Wilkinson s ta ted: 
[ I ] t r e a l l y b o i l s down t o a quest ion of whether they adhered 
t o that Code or they did not adhere t o the Code, and the 
quest ion of whether i t ' s a permitted use under the Code or 
i t was a nonconforming use . And I am not persuaded. I am 
not persuaded that there i s a fac tua l i s sue t h a t ' s present 
as far as the Development Code i s concerned. 
(A. 1:3 Ins . 23-25, 1:4 Ins . 1-2; emphasis added.) Judge 
Wilkinson apparently concluded that Summit County was mistaken in 
viewing the F a c i l i t y as a "permitted use ." 
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s f indings do not ident i fy any f a c t s , 
disputed or undisputed, t o support t h i s view of the Rai lroad's 
use; the evidence otherwise demonstrates that the Rai lroad's use 
of i t s r ight-of-way was very much in d i spute . Summit County 
h igh l ighted t h i s i s sue in correspondence with the p l a i n t i f f s ' 
counsel dated February 13, 1990, f i l e d as an exh ib i t in 
oppos i t ion t o the motion for p a r t i a l summary judgment. (R. 200-
01 attached as Addendum 8.) The Railroad l a t e r f i l e d an 
a f f i d a v i t regarding i t s use in connection with the motion for 
recons iderat ion . (R. 553-55) F ina l ly , several wi tnesses 
t e s t i f i e d at t r i a l regarding past use of the r ight-of-way for 
loading purposes. (R. 2615-18; 2794-98) 
Judge Wilkinson was somehow "persuaded" that the Rai lroad's 
h i s t o r i c use of i t s r ight-of-way did not s u f f i c e to create a 
- A nonconforming use i s "[a] use which lawfully ex i s t ed prior to the 
enactment of a zoning ordinance, and which i s maintained af ter the e f f e c t i v e 
date of the ordinance, although i t does not comply with the zoning 
r e s t r i c t i o n s appl icable to the d i s t r i c t in which i t i s s i tua ted . • . •" 
Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning, 4 ed. (1995) § 6.01 at 481-82. 
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preexisting use and a valid accessory use. However, on a motion 
for partial summary judgment in the face of a factual dispute, 
the trial court was not at liberty to favor one view of the 
evidence over another. 
The trial court itself identified a third area of factual 
dispute: the nature and extent of any harm to the plaintiffs 
caused by the alleged wrongs of Summit County. 
But I am also mulling over in my mind as to the many factual 
issues that might be there. By that I am saying this — and 
counsel has argued that the parties had not been injured. 1 
think he has a point to a certain extent. But I guess a 
factual issue could be that they were parties that have or 
are in the realm of injury or as he used the term, the 
quality of life. 
(A. 1:3 Ins. 16-22; emphasis added.) The extent of any claimed 
injury to the plaintiffs was an important fact consideration 
where the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief that Judge 
Wilkinson acknowledged on the record "could do irreparable harm" 
to Utelite. (R. 253:16) Yet, the trial court's Order For 
Partial Summary Judgment promises just such relief despite 
remaining factual issues. 
Judge Wilkinson committed error by implicitly deciding 
several disputed issues of material fact in order to grant 
partial summary judgment. This Court should vacate those 
findings and reverse the partial summary judgment. The trial 
court should consider all of the evidence regarding the 
Utelite/Summit County contacts and the results of those contacts 
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and only then determine whether the plaintiffs are entitled to 
any relief.-7 
II. SUMMIT COUNTY'S ACTIONS DID NOT VIOLATE THE DEVELOPMENT CODE 
AND, THEREFORE, JUDGE WILKINSON COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN HOLDING THEM NULL AND VOID. 
Judge Wilkinson clearly concluded, without any support in 
the record or legal analysis, that placement of the Facility on 
the industry track in Echo was a substantive violation of the 
Development Code. (R. 255:18-22) From the irrelevant and 
legally inconsequential facts set forth in his findings, Judge 
Wilkinson assumed an entire set of material facts not before him 
and then made the leap to an erroneous legal conclusion. Thus, 
several years later at trial Judge Noel faced the central issue 
to that point in the litigation—whether there was a substantive 
zoning violation—and could find only an "implicit" ruling in the 
1993 Order. (R. 2366) This implicit legal conclusion, aside 
from being based on disputed facts and undisclosed assumptions, 
was wrong as a matter of law. 
No one can seriously dispute that the Railroad has operated 
on its transcontinental right-of-way for over a century. As 
already noted, the Railroad in the past has operated a coal 
loading facility and conducted other railroad operations in Echo. 
Assuming that Summit County has jurisdiction over a federally 
- Evidence of the Railroad's past use and the plaintiffs' alleged 
injuries is now in the record as the result of the trial. 
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granted right-of-way,- the Railroad's use of its right-of-way is 
a valid nonconforming use predating the Development Code. 
In his February 13, 1990, letter to counsel (A. 8), Deputy 
County Attorney Franklin P. Andersen stated Summit County's 
position with respect to the allegation of a zoning violation: 
I don't believe we are concerned with a zoning issue, but 
rather a use issue[:] . . . whether loading aggregate into 
train cars is a use associated with railroading activities 
in the Echo railroad yards. 
In this instance, the railroad yard uses are non-conforming 
as defined in Summit County's Development Code, Section 
1.6(52). Transportation of freight is the very essence of 
the railroad business; loading and unloading of freight is 
fundamental to that activity and is necessarily performed in 
yards or depots. The activity of Utelite Corporation is a 
"use customarily incidental to and located upon the 
same . . . [property] . . . occupied by the main use and 
devoted exclusively to the main use of the premises." It is 
thus an accessory use subordinate, yet essential, to the 
main railroading use. See Summit County Development Code, 
Section 1.6(63). 
In entering partial summary judgment, Judge Wilkinson implicitly 
rejected this position without the least explanation why Summit 
County's interpretation "just [didn't] wash with him . . . ." 
(R. 237) 
The plaintiffs' position, embraced similarly without 
explanation by Judge Wilkinson, would greatly limit the 
Railroad's use of its right-of-way. The court gave no hint as to 
what would be a "valid accessory use" of the Railroad's 
admittedly valid preexisting use of its right-of-way. While this 
- Federal law governs a land grant right-of-way. Other courts have held 
that state or county action cannot impair a railroad's rights derived from the 
federal government. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 
630 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 995 (1981); Puett v. 
Western Pacific Railroad Co., 752 P.2d 213 (Nev. 1988). 
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determination is one of law, it ,ncan be answered only by 
consideration of the underlying factual situation.'" Alta v. Ben 
Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 800 (Utah App. 1992). Judge Wilkinson 
proceeded as if there were no "factual situation." 
This implicit legal conclusion led Judge Wilkinson to 
consider whether Summit County had made a fundamentally 
legislative decision on December 13, 1988, to change the zoning 
designation of the Railroad's property. Judge Wilkinson found 
that Summit County had made a formal "zoning decision" in the 
sense of exercising the legislative power to amend the provisions 
of the Summit County Development Code with respect to the 
Railroad's property as opposed to merely stating its 
administrative interpretation of the relevant provisions of the 
Development Code. 
The record shows the following sequence of relevant events: 
1. The president of Utelite contacted Jerry Smith, a 
member of the Summit County planning staff, to inquire whether a 
building permit was required for construction of the Facility at 
Echo. (R. 2114 at 65-67) 
2. In response, Smith stated his belief that there would 
be no building permit or other requirements, but suggested that 
Utelite confirm this with the Planning Commission. (R. 2114 at 
70; R. 550) 
3. Before the Planning Commission on December 13, 1988, 
Mr. Smith told the Planning Commission what Utelite proposed and 
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what he had stated in response and asked whether the Planning 
Commission agreed with him. (R. 2114 at 68-71) 
4. The Planning Commission indicated its agreement with 
Smith's statements to Utelite. The entire informal discussion 
took less than five minutes. (R. 2114 at 71) 
To characterize this as a legislative exercise of the zoning 
power is to transform a citizen's casual request for information 
into a full-blown deliberation by a public body. Such routine 
"over-the-counter" inquiries are made on a daily basis in 
jurisdictions all over the state of Utah. In this case, the 
trial court improperly characterized that routine inquiry and 
response as somehow constituting a procedural violation of the 
Development Code. 
The Court and the parties can only speculate as to the 
reasoning behind Judge Wilkinson's conclusion that Summit County 
violated its own Development Code. However, Summit County's 
conclusion remains undisputed: the activity of loading rail cars 
on an industry track in a railroad yard on a railroad right-of-
way in a transportation corridor constitutes an accessory use to 
the pre-existing use of rail traffic. Conversely, the course of 
dealings between Summit County and Utelite cannot fairly be 
characterized as a legislative exercise of the zoning power 
resulting in an amendment to the Development Code with respect to 
the use of the Railroad's property. At a minimum, this Court 
should reverse the trial court's summary judgment and remand for 
appropriate findings. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
ACTIONS OF SUMMIT COUNTY DEPRIVED PLAINTIFFS OF DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW. 
Without explanation, Judge Wilkinson found that Summit 
County had not afforded the plaintiffs due process. To find a 
lack of due process under the U. S. Constitution, a court must 
determine whether there is a protected liberty or property 
interest and, if so, what procedures are required to satisfy due 
process requirements. — Matthews v. Eldredcre, 424 U.S. 319 
(1976). See also Gray v. Dep't of Employment Security, 681 P.2d 
807, 816 (Utah 1984) (M[t]he prerequisites to the application of 
due process protections are: (1) state action and (2) a 
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest"). 
In this action, both the plaintiffs and the trial court 
employed the term "due process" without the slightest heed to its 
legal content. The plaintiffs did not allege or prove the 
existence of a protected property interest. They made no showing 
of what process was appropriate to protect their interests, much 
less that they were deprived of that protection. The court below 
likewise failed to engage in the requisite due process analysis. 
Even under circumstances where such allegations were 
adequately supported by the record, a mere violation of the Utah 
Open and Public Meetings Law does not rise to the level of a 
deprivation of due process. First, the right created by the 
statute is a legislatively created right, not a fundamental 
— The demonstration of a property interest is also required under the 
state constitution* See The Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293, 1298 (Utah 1982). 
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property or liberty right. Second, Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-1, et 
seq. provides a remedy (i.e., process) to address the claims of 
violation of the Open Meetings Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-4-8 
through -10. Because there is a process available, there is no 
basis for claiming denial of due process. See Smith v. Colorado 
Dep't of Corrections, 23 F.3d 339, 341 (10th Cir. 1994) 
("Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees pertaining to 
property are satisfied when an adequate, state post-deprivation 
remedy exists for deprivations. . . . " ) . 
The core issue remains whether the course of dealings 
between Utelite and Summit County was administrative in 
character, not requiring notice and hearing, or a fundamental 
exercise of legislative discretion resulting in a rezoning of the 
Railroad7s property which would require notice and hearing in 
order to satisfy due process requirements. The sole evidence 
before the trial court was that the activities were 
administrative. Absent demonstration of a protected interest and 
identification of the proper process to protect that interest, no 
finding of lack of due process can logically or legally follow. 
The trial court's determination that Summit County deprived the 
plaintiffs of due process is erroneous and should be reversed. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT SUMMIT COUNTY'S 
ACTIONS VIOLATED THE OPEN MEETINGS LAW. 
The Utah Open Meetings Law provides that any "final action" 
taken in violation of the provisions of the statute is "voidable" 
if suit is "commenced within 90 days after the action . . .,f 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-8. The undisputed facts in this case 
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establish that plaintiffs waited until July 31, 1990, 
approximately 16-1/2 months late, to file an action despite the 
commencement of construction on or about February 21, 1989 
(R. 128), the first loading of railroad cars on April 15, 1989 
(R. 109), and receipt of correspondence from the Deputy County 
Attorney outlining the County's position in considerable detail 
on February 13, 1990. (A. 8) 
In the face of those undisputed facts, Judge Wilkinson, 
without any explanation, accepted the plaintiffs' argument that 
the statute was subject to "equitable tolling.flli/ (R. 224; A. 
2:3) By this, he presumably meant that facts existed to place 
the Summit County/Utelite contacts within the ambit of the 
discovery rule articulated in Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 
(Utah 1981). (R. 225) The statute would be tolled if Summit 
County engaged in concealment of facts or there existed 
"exceptional circumstances that render the application of a 
statute of limitations irrational or unjust . . . ." Warren v. 
Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992). 
What evidence persuaded Judge Wilkinson to invoke the 
"equitable tolling doctrine" is yet another mystery for, aside 
from a single conclusion of law (No. 4), he offered no 
explanation for his ruling. (A. 2:3) The plaintiffs argued that 
the very omissions that constituted the violation of the Act— 
—' "Equitable tolling" is a doctrine developed in the federal courts 
that "permits a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations if 
despite all due diligence he is unable to obtain vital information bearing on 
the existence of his claim." Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 
451 (7th Cir, 1990), No reported Utah case has used this terra. 
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failure to give notice and to keep minutes—were the "exceptional 
circumstances" leading to concealment of the claim: "the very 
actions of which Plaintiffs complain also served to conceal the 
violations of the Act." (R. 225) 
If lack of notice, absence of minutes or the secret nature 
of a meeting sufficed to permit equitable tolling, the 90-day 
limitations period, which has no express tolling provision, would 
be a nullity. Any meeting covered by the statute would 
necessarily afford the basis for a claim of equitable tolling. 
As applied by Judge Wilkinson, the equitable tolling 
doctrine suspends forever the 90-day limitations period. The 
limitations period was not tolled; it was eliminated. This 
extraordinary conclusion requires a determination that neither 
construction of the Facility, commencement of operations, nor 
even Summit County's pointed correspondence with the plaintiffs' 
attorney (A. 8) put the plaintiffs on notice; they were free to 
file their Open Meetings Act claim at their leisure. 
The 90-day limitation on voiding final action for non-
compliance with the open and public meetings statutes seeks 
finality with respect to governmental action. The application of 
the Act now before this Court contradicts that policy. However 
one characterizes the December 13, 1988, contact, Utelite was 
entitled to (and did in fact) rely on the representations then 
made. To void any such action, the plaintiffs had to file an 
action by March 13, 1989. Instead of doing so, they watched as 
construction proceeded on the Facility. Sixteen and one-half 
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months late they sued to void the purported "final action." By 
then, the facility was built and had been in operation for over a 
year. The policy of finality mandates the application of the 
statute of limitations. This Court should reverse the partial 
summary judgment on the Open Meetings Act claim and vacate the 
award of fees under Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-9(2). 
Should the Court somehow determine the 90-day statute of 
limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-8 does not apply to these 
facts and circumstances, then it would become necessary to 
evaluate the merits of the plaintiffs' claim alleging a violation 
of the Open Meetings Law. It is important to note in that 
context that the plaintiffs do not dispute the adequacy of the 
notice for the December 13, 1988, Summit County Planning 
Commission meeting. Rather, they focus on the level of detail 
required in the agenda for that meeting. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, the plaintiffs' position 
would require specific notice and publication in the agenda of 
every single item discussed at a public meeting, no matter how 
ministerial or insignificant. This argument fails the test of 
reason. It is common for a public body of a local governmental 
unit subject to the Open Meetings Law to permit time for broad 
citizen input or staff reports as part of a meeting agenda 
without specific notice. Convening such a public body for the 
limited purposes of discussing or implementing administrative or 
operational matters is not even defined as a meeting to which the 
provisions of the statute apply. Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 52-4-2(2) (b) (ii)• It logically follows that such routine 
operational issues do not require a separate listing on the 
agenda and are not regarded as the type of "final action" to 
which the provisions of the Act apply. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ORDERING THE SHUTDOWN OF 
THE UTELITE FACILITY. 
The confusion underlying Judge Wilkinson's findings and 
substantive legal conclusions extends to his articulation of the 
relief granted. At the hearing on the motion, the trial court 
stated unequivocally: "I purposely am not issuing the injunctive 
relief." (R. 240:25) The judge noted that issuance of 
injunctive relief "could put them [Utelite] out of business. It 
could do irreparable damages to them . . . ." (R. 238:15-16) 
The Order For Partial Summary Judgment itself reads: 
The effectiveness of this order is stayed for sixty (60) 
days from the date this order is entered. If no appeal is 
taken within that time period, then an injunction shall 
issue and Defendant Summit County shall be required to 
effectuate the removal of Utelite from their currently 
occupied site. 
(A. 3:2) This language promises future equitable relief for the 
plaintiffs; yet once again, neither the findings nor the 
underlying record set forth evidence to warrant that relief. 
The plaintiffs and the trial court rely on Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-27-23 (1990, repealed July 1, 1992) to claim injunctive 
relief. That section authorized "any owner of real estate within 
the county" to "institute injunction . . . proceedings to 
prevent, enjoin, abate or remove the unlawful building, use or 
act." This statute has been construed not to require "a specific 
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showing of irreparable injury . . . ." Utah County v. Baxter, 
635 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah 1981)• (Note that the current version of 
this statute permits only the county to obtain an injunction by 
proof of a zoning violation alone. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-27-1002(1)(b).) 
Judge Wilkinson proceeded as if he had no discretion in 
fashioning a remedy for the perceived deviation from the 
Development Code. He ruled on an extremely limited fact record 
and disregarded the known facts that would dictate a less 
draconian remedy. First, the court ignored the plaintiffs' delay 
in bringing the action after they were aware of the construction, 
the operation and any alleged annoyance. Second, the court did 
not take into consideration Utelite's abandonment of the Wanship 
loading site at the Railroad's request. By the August 23, 1993, 
date of the partial summary judgment, Utelite had drastically 
changed its position—the Railroad had abandoned the Park City 
branch line and Utelite no longer had an acceptable existing 
alternate site for loading. Finally, the court overlooked the 
difficult position of Summit County. The Facility was at Echo 
because Summit County told Utelite that the placement would 
constitute a "permitted use." Such facts could well support a 
claim of "equitable estoppel" against the County. See Alta v. 
Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 802-03 (Utah App. 1992). 
Judge Noel at trial in 1995 pursued an inquiry into the 
facts that Judge Wilkinson failed to make in 1991. "[S]olely by 
reason of Judge Wilkinson's August 23, 1996, Order and the 
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findings implicit in that ruling," Judge Noel "found . . . that 
the Facility is a nuisance per se." (R. 2335) However, after 
considering four days of testimony regarding Utelite's operation 
of the Facility and "the Court's visit to the Facility while in 
operation and the Court's and third-party's review of videos, 
tapes and photographs of the Facility in operation," Judge Noel 
found: 
[T]he Facility at present (a) is not injurious to the 
plaintiffs, (b) does not adversely affect the plaintiff's 
[sic] use and enjoyment of their property, and (c) does not 
cause any property damage to the plaintiffs. 
(A. 6:4) The court concluded that the plaintiffs "are not 
entitled to any further equitable relief from this Court other 
than the equitable relief previously granted by Judge Wilkinson." 
(A. 6:5) 
The plaintiffs have now had the opportunity to be heard with 
respect to the merits of the placement of the Facility. Judge 
Noel (and the jury, which awarded only nominal damages even after 
being instructed that the Facility was a nuisance per se) found 
against the plaintiffs on the merits. To the extent the 
plaintiffs claim entitlement to an additional administrative 
hearing on any alleged zoning change or violation, the 
appropriate remedy should be the granting of such a hearing, not 
the closure and removal of the Facility. Judge Wilkinson 
committed error in identifying closure as the ultimate remedy in 
his August 23, 1993, Order and that portion of the Order should 
be reversed. 
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VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT UNION PACIFIC 
RAILROAD WAS NOT A NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THIS 
ACTION. 
The Railroad owns the right-of-way on which Utelite built 
the Facility. The plaintiffs alleged and the trial court ruled 
that, as a matter of law, the Railroad could not use its right-
of-way in Echo to load the goods of rail customers such as 
Utelite. At the same time, the plaintiffs argued and the trial 
court agreed that the Railroad was not an indispensable party to 
an action adjudicating its use of the right-of-way. This ruling 
was error. 
Rule 19, Utah R. Civ. P., governs joinder of indispensable 
parties: 
A person who is subject to service of process and whose 
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the 
action if . . . he claims an interest relating to the 
subject of the action and is so situated that the 
disposition of the action in his absence may . . . as a 
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect 
that interest. 
(Emphasis added). 
A party who must be present for a full and fair 
determination of his rights as well as the rights of the other 
parties is an indispensable party. Call v. City of West Jordan, 
788 P.2d 1049, 1054-55 (Utah App. 1990). "The purpose of the 
rule is to guard against the entry of judgments which might 
prejudice the rights of such parties in their absence." Cowen 
and Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109, 114 (Utah 
1984) ; see also Bonneville Tower Condominium Management Coinm/n v. 
Thompson Michie Assoc, Inc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1986) ("A 
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plaintiff may not obtain relief adverse to the property rights of 
others who are not adverse parties to the case without bringing 
them before the court"). 
The Railroad is an indispensable party whose property rights 
are directly impacted by this litigation. Judge Wilkinson's 
Bench Ruling acknowledged as much: 
I am also denying the Motion that the Union Pacific Railroad 
is an indispensable party. This Court is not convinced that 
it is. The parties entered into a contract with Utelite, 
and it will affect them. But they are not an indispensable 
party in this Court's opinion as far as the underlying 
decision that was made concerning the installation of the 
facility at Echo. 
(A. 1:2 Ins. 9-15 [emphasis added].) To so rule, the trial court 
had to ignore the precedent set by finding a violation of the 
Development Code in the placement of the Facility. As construed 
by the plaintiffs and Judge Noel, Judge Wilkinson held that the 
Railroad's nonconforming use at Echo did not permit an accessory 
use of loading customer materials onto railroad cars. 
This action centers on the Railroad's use of its Echo right-
of-way: whether surrounding AG-1 or RR-2 zoning displaces the 
Railroad's preexisting nonconforming use. The Railroad has a 
substantial interest in assuring that the accessory use of its 
property for loading continue despite the change in uses of 
surrounding property. The Railroad is clearly an indispensable 
party to such a determination. 
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VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADHERING TO PRIOR RULINGS AND 
ORDERS OF JUDGE WILKINSON WHEN THE ERROR IN THOSE RULINGS 
WAS DEMONSTRATED DURING THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
Judge Young, Judge Brian and Judge Noel each declined the 
invitation to revisit the issues resolved by Judge Wilkinson 
despite an expanded record and the manifest absence of any 
justification for the earlier partial summary judgment. Nothing 
in the record indicates that they agreed with his ruling, but 
they apparently felt bound in some fashion by the law of the case 
doctrine. 
Application of that doctrine arises frequently in Summit 
County and other counties with rotating judge assignments. See 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah App. 
1994); Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 439 (Utah 1993) (Orme, 
Ct. App. J. concurring). Judge Wilkinson/s ruling was not "law 
of the case." While generally "a judge cannot overrule the 
decision of another judge of the same court," DeBry v. Valley 
Mortgage Co. , 835 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Utah App. 1992), ,f[t]he second 
judge may reverse the first judge's ruling if the issues decided 
by the first judge are presented to the second judge in a 
^different light'. . . . " Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, 
Inc., 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984). 
Judge Orme of this Court, concurring in the Supreme Court 
case of Gillmor v. Wright, supra, offered the following critique 
of the law of the case doctrine as applied to an erroneous ruling 
of Judge Wilkinson in Summit County: 
I believe [the law of the case doctrine] was viewed with 
undue reverence by Judge Murphy, probably because the prior 
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determination had been made by a fellow judge who previously 
had the Summit County assignment• [Tjhis issue recurs with 
some frequency in counties served by rotating judges. . . . 
850 P.2d at 438. In Gillmor, Judge Murphy had concluded that law 
of the case "dictated" adherence to Judge Wilkinson's previous 
ruling. 850 P.2d at 439. Judge Orme argued that this view 
produced "an unwarranted delay in delivering justice and 
burden[ed] the appellate courts with issues that are capable of 
expeditious resolution at the trial level": 
The law of the case doctrine is not a limit on judicial 
power, but only a practice designed "to protect both court 
and parties against the burdens of repeated reargument by 
indefatigable diehards." [Citations omitted.] "The 
doctrine is not an inexorable command that rigidly binds a 
court to its former decisions but rather is an expression of 
good sense and wise judicial practice." [Citations 
omitted.] Id. 
Judge Orme saw a practical difficulty with adherence to law 
of the case in protracted litigation handled by different judges: 
Simply put, the law of the case doctrine does not prohibit a 
judge from catching a mistake and fixing it. [Citations 
omitted.] . . . If this had been Judge Murphy's case on his 
Salt Lake County individual calendar, and he had entered 
some interim order like Judge Wilkinson did, and he became 
convinced at trial that he was wrong, he would not have 
hesitated to fix it, relying on his fuller knowledge of the 
matter, more complete briefing, or other circumstances 
exposing the error. The happenstance that Summit County is 
still on a master calendar, served by constantly rotating 
judges, should not change that prerogative of the judge who 
actually decides the case on its merits. . . . [T]he two 
judges, while different persons, constitute a single 
judicial office for law of the case purposes, namely, the 
third district judge serving Summit County. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Judge Orme offered the following solution: 
In situations like the one before us, a judge who recognizes 
a mistake by the judge previously concerned with the same 
case and yet fails to correct that mistake simply delays the 
inevitable correction at the appellate level. In my view, 
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if Judge Murphy could have deviated from his own prior 
interim decision—and he clearly could have done so here—he 
could have deviated from Judge Wilkinson's, And he could 
have done so with certainty that this court would not 
reverse a second judge's sound correction of a prior error 
on the basis that the correction was not in accordance with 
the law of the case established by the first judge. 
Id. at 439-40 (Orme, Ct. App. J. concurring) 
This rationale has subsequently been followed in this Court. 
See Trembly, supra, 884 P.2d at 1311 (where the ruling on summary 
judgment was not a final order, the second rotating judge was not 
precluded from reevaluating the prior ruling). The facts of 
record simply did not support Judge Wilkinson's conclusion that 
Summit County had violated its Development Code. However, Judge 
Noel felt constrained to embrace the partial summary judgment and 
its implications. This led to extensive proceedings at great 
expense to the parties but of limited utility. 
It is clear from the jury's nominal verdict and the Findings 
and Conclusions Re: Equitable Relief ultimately entered by Judge 
Noel that neither fact finder vindicated Judge Wilkinson's view 
of the merits. While these determinations now cap any relief 
available upon retrial of this action, the trial need not have 
occurred had the judges who handled the case after Judge 
Wilkinson examined substantively the premises on which they were 
proceeding. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT A CLAIM OP 
NUISANCE PER SE CAN BE BASED ON AN ALLEGED LOCAL ZONING 
VIOLATION. 
Judge Noel, relying on Judge Wilkinson's implicit finding of 
a violation of the Development Code, held the Facility to be a 
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nuisance per se. So instructed, the jury considered only the 
issue of damages and returned a verdict of general damages 
ranging from $1,500 to $5,000 per plaintiff for alleged injuries 
spanning over six years. The jury found no injury to property or 
other special damages and no exemplary damages. (A. 5) Judge 
Noel found that the Facility was not presently causing any injury 
to the plaintiffs. (A. 6) 
To prove a nuisance per se, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that "the conduct creating the nuisance is also specifically 
prohibited by statute. . . . " Erickson v. Sorensen, 877 P.2d 
144, 149 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 
1994) . Violation of a county zoning ordinance is not a nuisance 
per se. Padien v. Shipley, 553 P.2d 938, 939 (Utah 1976) ("It 
was error to deem a violation of the ordinance a nuisance per se, 
viz., as a matter of law"). 
The trial court apparently viewed the language cited above 
as nothing more than dicta. However, the plaintiffs failed to 
cite any authority holding a zoning violation alone as a 
sufficient basis for finding a nuisance per se. Further, the 
plaintiffs did not identify a single instance of conduct on the 
part of Utelite that constituted a violation of a "specific 
statutory prohibition." Erickson, 877 P.2d at 149. In the words 
of the Erickson court, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that 
the legislature had "already struck the balance" between the 
"relative interests of the plaintiff and defendant" in favor of 
either party. Id. (citing Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939, 
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943 (Utah 1990)). Judge Noel's overly broad application of 
nuisance per se should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The most obvious resolution of this appeal is to remand for 
a hearing on the merits regarding fact issues improperly resolved 
by Judge Wilkinson. The results of the trial relating to damages 
would continue to serve as a ceiling to any relief on tort 
claims. 
The Court may also choose to hold as matter of law that the 
Facility is an accessory use to the Railroad's valid preexisting 
use. Such a holding comports with the record and would bring 
this litigation to an end. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /3 ^ay of October, 1996. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Jody K/]Burn< 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellants Summit County 
VAN COTT^BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Eric C. Olson 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Appellant Utelite Corporation 
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1 MONDAY, JULY 8 , 1 9 9 1 ; P . M . SESSION 
2 J U D G E * S B E N C H R U L I N G 
3 
4 THE COURT: Well, let me indicate to you that I 
5 have gone over the material, and the Court is still 
6 vascillating somewhat as far as the situation is concerned. 
7 But let me start to give you my ruling. 
8 First of all, I am denying the Motion to Dismiss 
9 on the question of standing. I am also denying the Motion 
10 that the Union Pacific Railroad is an indispensable party. 
11 This Court is not convinced that it is. The parties entered 
12 into a contract with Utelite, and it will affect them. But 
13 they are not an indispensable party in this Court's opinion 
14 as far as the underlying decision that was made concerning 
15 the installation of the facility at Echo. 
16 The Court is also of the opinion that the 
17 plaintiffs do not have the responsibility here as far as 
18 exhausting administrative remedies. I agree with everything 
19 both counsel say on that. But I think that the 
20 administrative remedy is a situation where of course there 
21 has been a zoning change or a question arises, then they have 
22 to take that to the Board of Equalization for them to make 
23 that decision and then take the course. 
24 I think that here we do have a situation involved 
25 as far as a legal issue involving due process, a possible 
OOO^Su 
1 constitutional issue. I also am of the opinion that the 
2 plaintiffs are not out of court on the Statute of Limitations 
3 under the Open Meeting Law. I am not thoroughly convinced 
4 that the Open Meeting Law is the crux of this case either, 
5 but I don't think they are out of court. 
6 Now, we get to the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
7 and I am having a hard time rationalizing in my mind that the 
8 County did not violate the office as far as the development 
9 laws, the Development Code and the Zoning Code as far as the 
10 properties are concerned. And also, when you say that the 
11 president of Utelite walked into a meeting and discussed this 
12 and then the administrator sends him a letter and says, Go 
13 ahead and do it, that it's a permitted use, it just doesn't 
14 wash with this Court that the activities can be carried on in 
15 that manner. 
16 But I am also mulling over in my mind as to the 
17 many factual issues that might be there. By that I am saying 
18 this -- and counsel has argued that the parties had not been 
19 injured. I think he has a point to a certain extent. But I 
20 guess a factual issue could be that they were parties that 
21 have or are in the realm of injury or as he used the term, 
22 the quality of life. 
23 And of course it's argued that the Development 
24 Code is a factual issue. But yet it really boils down to a 
25 question of whether they adhered to that Code or they did not 
nnn^tt 
1 adhere to the Code, and the question of whether it's a 
2 permitted use under the Code or it was a nonconforming use. 
3 And I am not persuaded. I am not persuaded that there is a 
4 factual issue that's present as far as the Development Code 
5 is concerned. 
6 I guess what I am saying and in talking to myself 
7 and making my decision here, that this Court is of the 
8 opinion that the Motion by the plaintiff is well taken, that 
9 the Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. The Court 
10 does grant their Motion for Summary Judgment. 
11 However, I do decline to grant their Motion for a 
12 Cease and Desist Order and for a Writ of Injunction. That I 
13 don't know what the parties intend to do concerning this 
14 matter -- I probably think I do. But I think that if I issue 
15 that cease and desist order, that could put them out of 
16 business. It could do irreparable damages to them during the 
17 appellate procedure. And I think that the parties could be 
18 further injured by that, but I think that that could be some 
19 monetary damages. And therefore, I am going to grant the 
20 Motion for Summary Judgment but refuse to grant the Motion 
21 for Injunctive Relief to cease and desist 
22 However, I will indicate that if this matter is 
23 not taken further, within 30 or 60 days, that the injunctive 
24 relief would be granted. And I am certainly not advising you 
25 to appeal the case, but in my own mind I can see that there 
0 0 0 ^ 
1 is probably not much chance that you are not going to. 
2 MR. NIELSEN: Would the Court mind restating or 
3 explaining its ruling with respect to the time limit, the 60 
4 days? I didn't quite understand. 
5 THE COURT: Well, I said 30 or 60 days. I am 
6 saying that if the defendants did not make the decision to 
7 appeal this case within 30 days, then the Injunction and 
8 Cease and Desist Order would be placed into effect. If an 
9 appeal is filed, then it would not be granted pending the 
10 disposition of the appeal. 
11 MR. APPEL: So essentially you are giving them a 
12 stay of 30 to 60 days before effectiveness? 
13 MR. NIELSEN: Is it 60 or 30? 
14 THE COURT: I said 60 or 30. Really I am saying, 
15 how much time do you need? I know these things take time. I 
16 think we better take 60 days. 
17 MR. NIELSEN: I would much prefer 60. 
18 THE COURT: I have no problem with that. This has 
19 been going on for two or three years now. I have no problem 
20 with that. Again, I am not advising you to appeal, but I am 
21 saying that I can see a devastating effect that that could 
22 have on the company. 
23 MR. APPEL: Your Honor, by means of clarification, 
24 you mentioned that I believe the Statute of Limitations did 
25 not affect us with respect to the Open Meetings Act. Did you 
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1 find a violation of the Open Meetings Act? 
2 THE COURT: Yes. I think the Open Meeting Law was 
3 violated. Well, first let me state this: I don't think this 
4 was ever put on the agenda. And I can understand what 
5 Mr. Anderson says. It wasn't put on the agenda, and 
6 therefore there was no minutes. But for them to allow an 
7 individual to walk into their meeting and make a presentation 
8 and then have their administrative officer respond to that, 
9 that causes me concern. And I think that's a violation of --
10 maybe it wouldn't be strictly the Open Meeting Law, but it 
11 would be a violation of the way their procedure was, the way 
12 they were doing business concerning that. That when that 
13 gentleman came in, that they then should have excluded him 
14 from that or put it in the minutes or set it up saying, You 
15 can appear at the next meeting and present your request. 
16 MR. APPEL: Okay, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Any other questions? 
18 MR. APPEL: One final. We asked for -- I guess 
19 what you have done is you have ruled that the zoning decision 
20 concerning Utelite is null and void because it was 
21 incorrectly done, but you are not ordering Summit County to 
22 proceed with the cease and desist. But you have ruled that 
23 it is null and void. 
24 THE COURT: That is correct. That is correct. But 
25 I purposely am not issuing the injunctive relief. 
1 MR. APPEL: But the declarations that I asked for 
2 have been granted? 
3 THE COURT: Yes. 
4 MR. APPEL: Okay. 
5 THE COURT: Any other questions? 
6 MR. APPEL: No, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Mr. Appel, would you prepare the 
8 pleadings and Findings of Facts? 
9 MR. APPEL: I will. 
10 THE COURT: If there is nothing further, then court 
11 will be in recess. 
12 (This concludes this Bench Ruling at 4:15 p.m.) 
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Civil No, 10718 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing July 
8, 1991, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding. The 
Plaintiffs were represented by Jeffrey W. Appel of Haley & 
Stolebarger, Defendants Summit County was represented by Franklin 
P. Anderson and Defendant Utelite Corporation was represented by 
John T. Nielsen. Argument was heard with respect to Defendant 
Utelite and Summit County's Motions to Dismiss and Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Having heard the arguments 
of counsel and being fully advised of the premises, the Court 
makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court hereby adopts the following Findings of Fact: 
1. In the Fall of 1988, Defendant Utelite Corporation 
(hereinafter "Utelite") decided to relocate a railroad loadout 
facility (hereinafter "Utelite facility") to Echo, Utah. 
2. On December 13, 1988, Utelite went before the Summit 
County Planning Commission seeking approval for construction of 
the facility in Echo. 
3. The posted agenda for the December 13, 1988 meeting of 
the Planning Commission provides no notice to the public that 
there would be a discussion concerning the proposed relocation 
and construction of the Utelite facility. 
4. The minutes of the December 13, 1988 meeting of the 
Planning Commission contain no reference to a discussion or any 
testimony concerning the proposed relocation and construction of 
the Utelite facility. 
5. Utelite received verbal permission at the December 13, 
1988 meeting of the Planning Commission to begin construction of 
the facility. 
6. On January 13, 1989, Jack Willis on behalf of Robert 
McGregor, Chairman of the Planning Commission, sent a letter to 
Utelite confirming a discussion at the December 13, 1988 meeting 
of the Planning Commission regarding the proposed relocation of 
the Utelite facility. 
7. The January 13, 1989 letter indicated that it was the 
consensus of the Planning Commission that the Utelite operation 
could be moved to the Echo location and would be considered a 
"permitted use" at the Echo site. 
8. Construction of the Utelite facility began on or about 
February 21, 1989 at a location directly across from and adjacent 
to a residential area of Echo in which Plaintiffs reside. 
2 
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9. On February 28, 1989, Utelite applied for and received 
from Summit County, building permit # 89007, which is 
specifically designated as an "electrical permit." 
10. The Utelite facility was substantially completed by 
April 25, 1989, at which time the first loading of railroad cars 
took place. 
11. In October 1989, Utelite made application for a 
building permit from Summit County, which permit was issued on 
November 28, 1989 as building permit # 89291 for the construction 
of the loadout facility in Echo. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that: 
1. Plaintiffs have standing to maintain this action 
pursuant to the terms of the Summit County Development Code, the 
laws of the State of Utah and the Constitution of the State of 
Utah. 
2. Union Pacific Railroad is not an indispensable party to 
this action. 
3. Plaintiffs in this instance were not required to 
exhaust administrative remedies for the reason that due process 
and other constitutional rights are involved and were violated. 
4. The statute of limitations contained in the open 
meeting law Utah Code Ann. §52-4-1 et seq. has not been violated 
due to application of the equitable tolling doctrine. 
5. The decision of Defendant Summit County concerning the 
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approval of utilization of the site currently occupied by Utelite 
Corporation was in violation of the provisions of the Summit 
County Development Code and, thus, that decision is null and 
void, 
6. The decision of Defendant Summit County concerning the 
approval of utilization of the site currently occupied by Utelite 
Corporation was made in violation of the provisions of the Open 
Meeting Act Utah Code Ann. §52-4-1- et seq. 
7. Injunctive relief requiring the County to ensure the 
removal of the Utelite facility is granted with the stay of the 
effectiveness of that portion of this order for sixty (60) days 
from the date of this order. 
DATED this >13 day of August, 1993. 
Honorable Homer .F^'Wilkinson V~ 
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Defendants, 
ORDER FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 10718 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED Plaintiffs 
Motion for Partial Summary judgment is granted and that the actions 
of Defendant Summit County with respect to the zoning decision 
allowing Utelite to occupy its current site was accomplished in 
violation of law, the Summit County Development Code, and the Open 
Meeting's Act and is thus null and void for the following reasons: 
1. The acts and omissions of the Defendants leading to the 
emplacement of the Utelite Facility in Echo, Utah, were contrary to 
the Summit County Development Code and are therefore null and void. 
2. Defendants actions were in violation of the Open and 
Public Meeting's law, Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-1 et seq. 
3. Defendants acts and omissions have harmed Plaintiffs 
without providing them due process of law. 
OOiMb.-
4. The effectiveness of this order is stayed for sixty'(60) 
days from the date this order is entered. If no appeal is taken 
within that time period, then an injunction shall issue and 
Defendant Summit County shall be required to effectuate the removal 
of Utelite from their currently occupied site. 
5. Defendant Utelite Corporation and Defendant Summit 
County's Motions to Dismiss are denied. 
DATED this day of August, 1993. 
So Ordered: 
f "*P1FfcA+fiQf)f>*rL 
Honorable Homer F. W^K^^cS/^V^ 
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By.. 
Deputy Cterk 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
$c 
K 
STATE OF UTAH 
m 
i«T. 
JANE HARPER, RICHARD D. 
HARPER, FRANK CATTELAN, 
RICHARD RICHINS and THE 
DICKER HILL TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body 
politic, the SUMMIT COUNTY 
COMMISSION, SUMMIT COUNTY 
PLANNING COMMISSION and 
UTELITE CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
M 
(P 
& 
ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 90-03-10718 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
On May 30, 1995, this Court heard argument in the 
above matter with respect to the various motions of the parties 
for partial summary judgment on claims and defenses in this 
action. The plaintiffs were represented by James L. 
Warlaumont. The Summit County defendants were represented by 
Jody K Burnett and Franklin P. Andersen. The defendant Utelite 
Corporation ("Utelite") was represented by Eric C. Olson. By 
agreement of the parties, the hearing took place in Salt Lake 
City, Utah rather than in Summit County, Utah. 
s 
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The Court having reviewed the submissions of the 
parties, having heard the argument of counsel and being 
otherwise sufficiently advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
1. Utelite7 s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
the claim of nuisance per se is denied. 
2. Utelite' s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
the claim of trespass is denied. 
3. Utelite's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
the claim of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress is granted. There exists no genuine issue of material 
fact with respect to the alleged outrageousness of Utelite' s 
conduct and Utelite is entitled to judgment on the Tenth Cause 
of Action as a matter of law. Nothing in this Order, however, 
shall limit the plaintiffs from claiming damages for emotional 
distress under their nuisance and trespass claims. 
4. Utelite's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
the claim for attorney' s fees and costs pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56 is granted and the Eleventh Cause of Action is 
dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiffs' renewing said 
claim after the conclusion of trial. 
5. The plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Utelite' s defenses of estoppel, waiver and laches 
is denied. 
6. The Court reserves until after the jury trial 
herein any ruling on Summit County' s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on the claim for award of attorney' s fees and costs 
MKT r t t t t 7 5 5 
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under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1988 as w 
54-2-9. , ,•] ,;•//*^ '-
DATED this iC> day of ^giis-t/ 1995. 
Pat B. Brian, Judc^e 
Third Judicial District 
Summ i t Coi inty 
Approved as to Form: 
A c t o r n e v c : f n r ^1 a i j p f i ^ ^ s 
^£2' 
-J± Attorneys rnor Summit County 
)efendants 
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ADDENDUM A-5 
F I I F D 
FEB fc 7 v - O 
Clerk ot Summit L uumy 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMffctT C U L ^ ^ C t e r k """~^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANE HAEFZR, RICHARD D. 
HARPER, FRANK CATTELAN, 
RICHARD RJ CHINS and THE 
DICKER "T- r TRUST 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a uody 
politic, the SUMMIT COUNTY 
COMMISSION, SUMMIT COUNTY 
PLANNING COMMISSION and 
UTELITE CORPORATION, 
Delundants. 
FINAL'JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL 
VERDICT 
Civi] No. 90-03-10711 
Judge Frank *. Noe] 
*- L/ 
*• 
CM , 
The damage claims by the pi aintiffs herein against 
the defendant 'Ti"cl i t^ - Corporation W P I T tried I *» ,i j n >\ in 1 ILJ; 
i^l '-• .^'-'-i -LA through J'•», 1995. The Court also heard 
tiit evidence \.^LL respect to the plaintiffs' claim, for 
equitabl •'" r^l ; ^  t supplementn> . r el :i ef al ready 
,;w.-; i- :. iuLion. 
Judge Frank G. Noel presided at. the trial The 
plaint, \ f fr we? representr-.i : • ' •-. •-.-. :-: ,mm< "ill 'I'll-
representee ;;y Li:,. , -,-isoiJ. 1'he Coui L now 
inai Judgment :., this action disposing of all 
a i ms 1 r 1 :- " - • * • •. 
i5eiCi.e tiiu commencement of trial, the Court 
determined tha* the Oixler Granting Partial Summary Judgment 
entered on August 23, .i.-;v; - • - : -. 
d e f ei idai := 
e n t e r s i \ 
r emain ing - i 
11
 Wd Ikinson Order") was law of the cas- and, h\ implication, the 
Wilkinson -'*r»i' i ru* 1 u-i« • ^  Mv1 find "Mia *-;"if *~ ^ n Utelite loading 
f a c :i 1 :i t y i \-
 L op me n t 
Code. Bast-o ihi:- i iodine implicit- t :- Wilkinson Order, 
the Court tijrt-'^ r h^TH <-hnf th~ Utelite loading facility in 
Eel io, I Jta • - •_ , . . . <*. 
Th« .•.^ /t.i.-s thereafter stipr]uted t the dismissal 
without p ^ judi.ee of -J~1 ] r^ T.ni^ ir.- ' ieuiies 01 1 ~ a' ] ' 
nuisance, respass ana n^g^^gci.cc advanced bv tn*j plaintilfs 
against the delendant UteJite Corpora: i-'i;. This stipulation 
•.-I . i.mson ;^  ^ . : . uiajil. jii^  i • *.. t JCII !)u,.ifii) Luugmcn The 
defendant utelite expressly waived it, right *o assert the bar 
UJLSIUISSCLI Wll.ii iil p i e j u d i c t - . 
The- . s s u ^ ot . l a b i l i t y I r - i r u r e s o l v e d a s a m a t t e r of 
. - T - • • . - • • ' - • ; : : i
 4 , . g 
e i - S h e e e e ^ wiLii u i p r e j u d i c e , o n l y e h e i s s u e s o r a c t u a l a n d 
p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s woi e s u b n n ' e^ fo r ;:• i s i d o r a t i o n by t fte i u ^ y . 
dS p<Ai.t x.: a iJj L-vhai V e x d i c i , \%, >. • •/ •• a r . s w ^ r e d a s . i n d i c a t e d : 
P l e a s e a n s w e r t h e f o l l ' j w i n a q u e s t i o n s f rom a 
p : <- ; • ' • • < • ] - M i •* : . 
evld« n e e p r e p o n d e r a t e s 111 i :.- 1 c-i i ne i s s u e 
22U8OO50.1 
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p r e s e n t e d , answer "Yes " I f you f i n d t h e e v i d e n c e 
so e q u a l l y ba LarK^d - -..;• v i c a n n o t determine a 
p : - r - -u-.\ .-I!J. •• . - : e, c i: :i f y ou f i i id t h a t 
t h e e v i d e n c e p r e p o n d e r a t e s • <• ga ins t 1 he issu<-
p r e s ^ n t e d , answer "N-* '' A"!so, dn," -'^macros : ^P*-.-:.^(-
I i: i; ; <_p'_:. j e r a n c e ._,: Li:t - V . . J U L , : L . 
WCJi~~: Utel i t: < • I oadi r: T f aci 11 •• y a proximate 
cause of damaaes to: 
Ri.'i. . i:(., , • • Yes X No 
J a n e H a r p e r Yes_, X No 
Frank " a l ' t e l a n V r js .. 7- ^  
Richard Kicnins & 
the Dicker Hill Trust v-?- ,, r o 
vou answered question ;: •. "y--.sM as L D any of 
the plaintiffs tli'-n go on to the next: questions. 
Ofhr:*T'se hav« * '° opersoi: 1 ]•: ' '-e '-r*rn 
a* v .urn to * ii^  courtroom. 
!i you answered question #1 "yes" as to any 
of tho pliintiffs then as t• :> t: 1 iat p] a 1 nt::i ff a i lswer 
t • a questions; 
What amount <^ n-oney w,i ] ] fairly compensate the 
p]air' Ar'fp. i' } d-rr- -K- • si ista :i ned a s a r>-
1 , •:,.;.;;... y I^J . .;s operation? 
General Damages: (adverse health effects, 
inconvenience, annoyance, discoinf i-* .1 oss of 
uamiPAGF 902 22U80050.1 
02/13/96 
< • : . ,
 : :cni. -..: home and property., mental distress and 
emotional in jury to the dat<_ of trial.) 
Richard Harper 
J ane Harper ^5, 
Frank Ca11elan $3,Juu 
Richard 
the Dicker Hill Trust n .  L~or 
Ricucii u and Jane Harper 
Frank Cat:tP 1 a n 
R i c h a r d R i c h i n s & 
the Dicker Hill Trust 
I josp < if fVuslnesi- Income '. 
Frank Cattelan $ 0_ 
Considering all the evidence in the case, do 
you find from, cl ear and convlncinc -vi-di-*.--- "- t 
plai i rti f f s ai: e ei i1 L L iea no an awaia i p^::i» j.ve and 
exemplary damages, against Utelite Corporation? 
Answer: Yes No X 
;r>/~ - -The Court having reviewed *-h 
~j 111 v ! i, iv i iii" | hiMiil 1 IK1 t M/ i (j(.niij«j a/ M - >, navjug considered the 
argument and submissions of counsel an.; beinc therwise duly 
and sufficient"': r advised, 
I ^iMd) -M<r.kKi; . . i ADJUDGED as follows: 
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1. ; . , . : . ; , ; i -lane Harpe r i s awarded "judgment 
a g a i n s t th<*- d e r e n d a n t U: e l i t e C o r p o r a t i o n in : he amount 
f/1- , * > • - * o r c s t t h e r e o n ix . . , . , . .
 rr_, ;., i - r . .. 
j i i i * -. . 
2. Yhe plaintiff Richard Harper is awarded 
judgment aa^ r ,/ a M;. 1 J-i-.i ' • : . : n :i i: 1 tl le 
... . . i.terest theitiu) at the statutory rate 
iron; r.he date f tins Judgment . 
3 . • i . .jwaia^-i 
judgmo:/ iigajn. *. the d»-itndani Uteiitie Corporation ::; \he 
amount of £*-'.'• with interest thereon at the statutory rate 
from tne ' * • ' ; ;: -i.t. 
4 . /he pJ a i in; i f I s Richard Richins and r he Dicker 
Hi] 3 '/rust aTd iuintlv awarded judgment agains** *"u-~ 1*- 'V* n.r: 
Ut:e3 ! J - : > • , .. . ntei^st 
thereon at. 1- h^ .statutory rate from th*- iatt* ••: this Judgment . 
5. Wirn respect '• ^  1 u> ; • i ^ r i f f n •• ' -- - >r 
pj'or/--^ ,'.,,«.
 t . t, , CJMJ ;,uLit.,.ve damages, 
Jnagiunn >> nei'-by entered ,n favoi oi * he defendant Utelite 
Corporation and against the plaintiffs and said clai ins are 
dismii s.1-- • : e 
fj court, does no! grant '/i^ plaintiffs any 
equitable relief apart from such equitable r~1 : - = "Le 
221X80050.1 
02/13/96 
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plaintiffs may be entitled to pursuant to the terms of the 
Wilkinson order. 
DATED this / Q day of Dtovefflfeer, 1996 
Frank G. Noel, Distriht^^W&ii/,^ 
Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i A ^ S A ^ 
Summit County AsS** %^% 
£&$ «... <t^"i. 
r O = 
22U80050.1 
02/13/96 
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ADDENDUM A-6 
NO. 
F I LE D 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
E r i c C. Olson (#4108) "' ty-
MAY 1 7 1996 
ClerK of Summit County 
A t t o r n e y s f o r Defendan t U t e l i t e C o r p o r a t i o n DeputyOterk 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
& -
STATE OF UTAH 
JANE HARPER, RICHARD D. 
HARPER, FRANK CATTELAN, 
RICHARD RICHINS and THE 
DICKER HILL TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs -
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body 
politic, the SUMMIT COUNTY 
COMMISSION, SUMMIT COUNTY 
PLANNING COMMISSION and 
UTELITE CORPORATION, 
Defendants 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
RE: EQUITABLE RELIEF 
Civil No. 90-03-10718 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
The Court heard evidence at the trial in this action 
held on September 12 through 15, 1995. The Court has issued 
Minute Entries dated February 13, 1996 and April 25, 1996 with 
respect to the plaintiffs' claim for equitable relief 
supplementary to any such relief already awarded in this 
action. The Court has also entered its Final Judgment of 
Special Verdict resolving, inter alia, the plaintiffs' claim 
for equitable relief. 
• i • J < > 
On the basis of the jury's verdict and the Court's 
independent determination of facts based on its view of the 
evidence presented at trial including a personal view of the 
properties in question, the Court now enters the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant Utelite Corporation ("Utelite") 
operates a loading facility (the "Facility") adjacent to the 
Union Pacific railroad tracks at Echo, Utah. 
2. The plaintiffs own property in the vicinity of 
the Facility. The Union Pacific railroad tracks that run 
through Echo, Utah lie between the Facility and the property 
owned by Jane Harper, Richard D. Harper and Frank Cattelan. 
Trains go through Echo, Utah on these tracks in excess of 
fifteen to twenty times per day. 
3. At the Facility on a weekly basis, Utelite loads 
an average of six and one-half railroad cars with its kiln 
dried aggregate products. 
4. Semi-trucks transport the aggregate product to 
the Facility for loading. It takes four trucks approximately 
forty minutes to load a single railroad car. 
5. The Utelite Facility currently operates, with 
occasional exceptions, on weekdays during daylight hours. 
132X86300 1 2 
6. To deal with dust from the loading operations, 
Utelite has taken the following steps: 
a. Construction of a metal enclosure at the 
Facility. 
b. Installation of a bag house and duct work 
at the Facility. 
c. Paving of the access road to the Facility. 
d. Installation of curtains and an electric 
door at the Facility. 
e. Watering down aggregate at the Utelite 
plant. 
f. Installation of a hood and metal coverings 
over the conveyor belt and drop areas at the 
Facility. 
g. Response to resident complaints called in 
to the Utelite plant including termination of 
loading on windy days. 
7. To deal with noise problems from the operation 
of the Facility, Utelite has taken the following steps: 
a. Installation of a muffler on the bag house. 
b. Instruction to truckers not to bang 
railroad cars in connection with loading. 
8. To deal with other annoyances, Utelite has: 
a. Removed outdoor lighting at the Facility. 
b. Terminated night loading. 
c. Instructed truck drivers to yield to other 
vehicles seeking access to the frontage road on 
the far side of Interstate 84 through the road 
at the Facility. 
9. As a result of the actions taken by Utelite, 
confirmed by the Court's visit to the Facility while in 
operation and the Court's and third-party's review of videos, 
tapes and photographs of the Facility in operation, the 
Facility at present (a) is not injurious to the plaintiffs, (b) 
does not adversely affect the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of 
their property, and (c) does not cause any property damage to 
the plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has equitable power pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-38-1 to enjoin or abate any nuisance created by 
Utelite at the Facility. 
2. The Court has found solely by reason of Judge 
Wilkinson's August 23, 1993 Order and the findings implicit in 
that ruling that the Facility is a nuisance per se. 
3. Notwithstanding the Court's finding that the 
Facility is a nuisance per se, in order to obtain further 
equitable relief from this Court with respect to the present 
operation of the Facility, the plaintiffs have the burden of 
proving that the Facility presently is injurious to their 
132\86300 1 4 
health, is offensive to the senses, or obstructs the free use 
and enjoyment of their property. 
4. The plaintiffs have failed to meet that burden 
of proof and are not entitled to any further equitable relief 
from this Court other than the equitable relief previously 
granted by Judge Wilkinson. 
DATED this /ffi day of 
Approved as to Form: 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Frank G. Noel, Dis 
Third Judicial Disv N„ w 
Summit County ^ 0 $ ^ ""''<f%\ 
l^f SUMMIT""^ 
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ADDENDUM A-7 
BJMMTT COUN JTT 
8TA.TB @F OTJJ 
P.O. BOX 1 2 8 
COALVILLE, UTAH 
8 4 0 1 7 
(801)330-445! 
< . i 11« • M 
January I.7, 19-9 
Carsten Mortpn.sen 
p.o. nox :e? 
Coalv i l l e , UT P.J017 
RE: P.eloc-ricn of Uteii tp Fnnili t-i^s 
Dear Mr. Morter.ren: 
This i s to confirm a ciscussion at. tit? December 15th Planning Commission 
meetinr reparriin.R the relocation of rhe f a c i l i t i e s . 
I t WPS the con^nsus of tht- Commiscicr. that the Utel i te ci:-ration presently s^t-
up in Vanship on the Union Pacific rai lroad l ines could he moved to the Echo 
locat ion. This would be considered a permitted use a t the Echo c i t e . 
If you hnvp any questions pl°ase ca l l the Summit County Planning Office a t 
v-:,6-«i/i^1 pyr, y v . 
Sinc^Qely, 
. •-. r~.^ r* Pohor" '• v.o: 
Summit Coun ty Planninr Commission 
00012J 
ADDENDUM A-8 
ROBERT W. ADKINS 
SUMMIT COUNTY ATTORNEY 
TERRY L CHRISTIANSEN 
\SSISTANT SUMMIT COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Si VlIT COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICh 
SUMMIT COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
P.O. BOX 128 
COALVILLE, UTAH 84017 
TELEPHONE (801) 336-4468 
FRANKLIN P. ANDERSEN 
DEPUTY. SUMMII COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ALOMA M EBCANBRACK 
PARALEGAL 
-^
 , V U " 
^H/SlT /{ 
February 13, 1990 
Jeffrey W. Appel 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
Tenth Floor, Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1956 
RE: Union Pacific 
Echo, Utah 
Utelite Loading Facility 
Dear Jeff: 
By way of direct answer to your concerns previously expressed, 
please be advised that your requested actions of Summit County 
authorities to issue immediate "cease and desist orders to 
Utelite Corporation" and to initiate a zoning or rezoning process 
for the Echo area have been thoroughly reviewed by this office. 
For the following reasons, neither action was found appropriate 
at this time. 
Although much dialogue has been devoted to characterizing the 
Utelite Loading Facility as existing contrary to County zoning 
requirement, such characterization is, in my opinion, incorrect 
and misfocused. I don't believe we are concerned with a zoning 
issue, but rather a use issue. I have therefore reviewed your 
request in light of the question of whether loading aggregate 
into train cars is a use associated with railroading activities 
in the Echo railroad yards. 
In this instance, the railroad yard uses are non-conforming as 
defined in Summit County's Development Code, Section 1.6(52). 
Transportation of freight is the very essence of the railroad 
business; loading and unloading of freight is fundamental to that 
activity and is necessarily performed in yards or depots. The 
activity of Utelite Corporation is a "use customarily incidental 
£^n i\ 
Jeffrey 17 . A c z e 1 
February 13, 1990 
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A c c o r d i n g l y , 
p o w e r s in a:*; 
r a i l r o a d t o 
a n o t h e r a r e a 
p o l i c e p o v; e r 
r i o h t s . 
h a v e c o n c i s e : ! t h a t t o 
. 11e mp t t o c ::?. p e 1 U t e 1 11 e 
• a s e o p e r a z1 : n s or t o m o v 
• ou1d be an u n r e a s o n a b l e -
nv oke t h e C : : n t y ' s p o 1 i • 
C o r p o r a t i o n a n d / o r t h e 
s u c h o p e r a t i o n s t o 
:•: e r c i s e of z r. e C o u n t y ' s 
and an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t a k i n g of v e s t e d p r o p e r t y 
S i n c e r e l y , 
Frafiklin P. Andersen 
Deputy Summit County A :c m e y 
ame 
cc: Summit County Commission 
Jim Peterson 
Susan Glasman 
000201 
